Response to Scott



This is my response to a discussion here


I post this at the risk of not having proofread.


Scott,


Were you being charitable when you wrote this or are you intentionally filtering information based on some set of rules?


I think that much of what I said was a conservative (as it cautious) claim. I granted that you may be right about religion forming our views on right and wrong but I noted that it is wrong to conclude that just because some behavior, or sensitivity was cultivated means that it isn't natural. After all, basic hygene and grooming is natural, but it is also cultivated.


I'm referring to cosmic good and evil. Please do not confuse this with a the idea that fairness results in * better outcomes and oppression results in worse outcomes, or that punishment serves to educate and protect others.


Well I wasn't arguing that there. I was referring to common ground that most (at least loud) atheists would agree with. I don't buy that you can escape the necessity of basic mental functions of oughtness and the percieved value of people upon which we weigh what are better outcomes and what educational ends that we value. It is from there that the question comes up. Is neurological structure really sufficient to support our powerful subjective (by which I do not mean individualistic) sensitivities of right and wrong or must we conclude that they are illusions that are not true in themselves but are merely the product of some selective processes and neurological structures. While evolution may (or may not) have selected the genes that led to our moral processes, it does not stand to reason that we protect people because think that they share our genes. Our thought processes generally involve the recognition that people have intrinsic value and worth. Is this true, or is it the mere means to an naturalistic evolutionary end?

Now you can shift the discussion to a “cosmic force of good” but I'm just going to go back to this approach I've outlined as I believe it is an essential component of demonstrating that there is a transcendent element to us that is not done justice on the grounds of materialism. And I recognize and fully embrace that such a conclusion cannot be arrived at on purely objective grounds. I don't claim that following reason eliminates choices that are rational themselves as some atheists (and Christian apologists) would pretend.


Rob, I'm not suggesting that progress cannot be made. Instead, I'm asking how you decide in which direction should progress be made, as both are considered to be internally consistent and thoroughly refined?


A question like that can't be dealt with a part from the details. But at a general glance, I will say that a free will theist position is, I believe has seen the best progress and is more biblically and morally consistent than the determinist position... at least applied to the world that God decided to create and has gone wrong though God is always at work to repair the damage according to his wisdom and timing (which has him contantly on the job).


Or perhaps "progress" will result in a new theology all together, which could be internally consistent and eventually thoroughly refined as well? Certainly, it has happened before.


I don't think there ever has been a whole new theology (within the context of theism) It's important to realize that even on your own question of Calvinism vs. Arminianism, the theologians within these traditions have more in common than they have in difference, though the differences are important and have to be dealt with. New theological answers have arisen for progress, but a truly completely new theology would not be progress. It would be starting from scratch. While we recognize that stagnate traditionalism is an affront to progress (and quite possibly truth), progress cannot occur apart from some degree of tradition. If the originators of some wholly new theology did anything of lasting value, it would by definition be to start a new tradition.


However, given God's supposed infinite nature, it could be that none of them are even remotely accurate.

Well, if we are dealing with the Christian tradition, the infinite God we believe in gave us revelation and created our minds sufficient enough to understand deep and important truths about him and his works. The extreme emphasis of God's infinitude at the expense of personhood, human understanding and relationship has not been an example of progress.


Some liberal Christians do not believe in a literal hell. Should a being decide to sentence people to an eternity of horrendous agony and torture, instead of eternal separation, this would seem to indicate a rather fundamental difference in their nature, don't you think? Could it be that these liberal Christians personally think such a punishment would be excessive, and therefore reject this teaching?

I agree that the most literal interpretations of hell do not make much sense. But the nature of hell may not be just about God's nature. It may have to do with our nature as well. Perhaps God created us to be eternal no matter what (that there is something fundamental about the mind that can't be unraveled no matter what), so letting us be without his presence even at the most minimal sustainging level is agony.

Hell is not something though that I have a thorough grasp on. My essential thinking about hell has been with regard to the doctrine of reprobation with which I strongly disagree.



I mentioned that God is not our conception of God to which you asked:

What if what you conceive as God is actually the universe? Using this line of thinking, it's unclear how you could discern between the two.

I'd say that you're taking this line of thinking to an extreme which isn't necessary. While it's true that our concept of God is not God himself, it nevertheless is one aspect of our connection with him and one aspect of knowing God. Our concept of God isn't everything, but it is highly important none the less. And I believe that my concept of God, while it could be improved, is nevertheless close to what God is like.

I said:

In short, the church doesn't necessarily need explicit divine guidance on this of the type that we see within scripture.


to which you replied:

And you know this how?


It is an inference from how explicit divine guidance has played a role in the life of God's people.



I said:
Reaching John would represent such an opportunity for others, but it's not like that would be their only opportunity.


To which you replied:
The problem here, is that you're making assumptions about individuals to which you have little to no knowledge,

I'm not assuming. I am applying my biblically based beliefs about God's grace to a situation where there is no definite knowledge. You can't say for certain that they won't have other opportunities.

Now you refferenced his material being studied in class, but the primary school room audience for John's book would ironically be Christians taught by Christians who think that John raises valid points, but not so valid that Chrisianity should be abandoned. But valid enough that serious Christian thinkers should wrestle with the claims made.

and about God, who's plan you yourself claim we cannot know in detail.

I woudn't say that we can't know God's plan in detail. I'd just say many details aren't knowable, but God's central plan was made very explicit in Scripture.


How do you determine if someone has received sufficient information about God?

I don't have a systematic way of determining that. I'd have to be on an individualistic basis, and even then, it may be only known to God who looks on the heart. John I would say has received sufficient information. Of course he's had problems with the wealth of information with which he had been trained, but as far as I can tell, John made choices in his life such that he undermined his willingness and/or ability to look for deeper solutions and do some outright rethinking of some important things while remaining true to the faith. I don't say this to brush off his arguments, but only to highlight that the emotional/relational battle was not secondary to the intellectual battle that he was waging.

I'll tell you what. While I don't presume to know the solution to all the problems he's highlighted which I haven't read (but hey, I've read plenty of his writing on the internet anyhow), If in some situations he'd taken a different route, perhaps he wouldn't have gotten a sympathetic letter from Norman Geisler, but would've been roasted by him in a book or letter to Christianity Today.


How do you know there isn't an issue now that needs to be solved by such a means?


I am just applying my theology that God is perfect and does everything that he deemes wise. If it's not done, then it didn't need to be done and God is doing something else working in different ways.


As a planet, would you not say we not backsliding and rebellious? Is God restricted in the means which he could respond?

I'd say that God is moving through his church (which is not to condone everything that happens from groups that are shallowly labeled as such), and he is not finished with his work as the planet is rebellious.


From me:
God's rescue plan isn't to save a group of independent individuals. God didn't create us to just be individuals. We do not fully reflect the image of God as individuals. And our dependency on each other is part of the context for redemption because our broken social nature is part of the problem.

your reply:

You haven't shown how this is mutually exclusive. Even if God should have these goals none of them excludes him from speaking to us directly.


I don't have to show that they are mutually exclusive. It only has to be reasonable that the method I describe is more effective for God's purposes given the kind of creatures that he created AND the degree and shape of redemption that he wants them to have.


Which effectively takes free-will off the table.

I gave four or five reasons why God enabled free will. Provided God does not jeopardize his purposes in creating us free, he may affect our free will. So his changes to free will must be ballanced, but your replied with the comment above.

I don't see why you make that step. To say that God maintains a balance between our free will and his affects on our free will doesn't lead us to taking free will off the table. You can't balance something that you don't have to balance. If you disagree, you'd have to explain that because it isn't evident at all.


Just so I'm clear, it appears that you're suggesting one could have a true, personal relationship with someone, yet not know if that someone would predetermine one's soul to eternal damnation. Is this correct?

It's unclear how this could be a true relationship, as this would be a fundamental part of God nature. In other words, are Calvinists really worshiping the Christian God or something else?


Why couldn't a true relationship involve this? Relationships are complex and come in different degrees.

I don't know it would be exactly correct to say that this would be a fundamental part of God's nature since within theism (including Calvinism) God did not have to create us and if he didn't have to create us, he didn't have to damn anyone.

Furthermore, having a relationship with someone doesn't mean that you know every important part of their life. Consider at the Michael Jackson funeral, Michael's daughter commented that he was the best father one could ever have and she showed a sincere greif at his passing. Surely she had a real relationship with him, and yet Michael may have done some very evil things with other children. Just because she didn't know about it (at least hopefully none of Jackson's kids were so abused) doesn't mean that she didn't have a real relationship with him.

As for fundamental nature and personal relationship, I would maintain that we can have a personal relationship with god even though there are many fundamental aspects of God that we have no clue about, such as why God should exist and how he exists.


What about the Mormons, who also believe Jesus died for our sins? Where do you draw the line, and why?

If they love Jesus and follow his teachings, I'd say they are in pretty good shape even with their distortions. But they do have some very significant distortions which I think has the potential to be determental to their standing with God. But ultimately, I don't worry about drawing all the lines and making sure their crisp. Ultimately, that is God's concern. The most important thing though is to be Christ centered and not worldview centered (the world view is important and yet it is not central.)

from me:
But where I am operating from the history of Israel and the church, you'd be speculating this.

from you:

You seem to be making the mistake as Bluemongoose. I do not hold this position as factual. I'm asking how you have determined this scenario does not explain what we observe, but Christianity does.

Notice the contraction in “you'd”. I know you don't hold this. But you're asking me to explain why I don't find this view more impressive. Well, there's just not much there given the very general level at which you explained it. And I highlighted a very important question. Where does the view come from? That is just as important as the question of how it lines up with the world.

I said:
If this evil twin is truly a twin to God and coeternal and coequal with equal explanation to the tragic side of nature and humanity, then I could not affirm all of nature as good or basically good.

to which you said:

The cosmic good of humanity is a claim of Christianity, and the other side of the same coin.

I don't know what you are saying here. But if you are saying that evil is the other side of the same coin, I argued the contrary from example. All you have given me is the bare claim, but I have no reason to find it compelling.


This is *your* experience of cosmic good and evil, again, shaped by Christianity.

Which I argued for from experiences that are common for humans. Yes, my Christianity cultivated this observation which is reasonable nonetheless. If you think otherwise, I'd like to see why my examples are lacking.


You're assuming that, should God have an evil twin, this would manifest in a specific way, such as things would be all good or all evil. On what basis do you make this assumption?


If I have to assume something about this picture of God's evil twin, its because you didn't spell it out. I'm not pushing the merits of this view.

I said:
Simple doesn't mean adequate

to which you said:

Obviously.


This is good. I think my example demonstrating an overly simple picture could be advanced further, but their's no point since you agree with what I was trying to demontrate.


But neither are they mutually exclusive. Nor haven you shown how this scenario is not adequate.

I didn't imply that they were mutually exclusive. But I think you've shown why I wouldn't be able to show that this alternative scenario is inadequate. I had to make assumptions just to deal with it. So it is bereft of details. And my initial concern remains which was to point out that the source of narrative is no less important than it's quality of explanation of the world.

Examples assumptions?

Here, I'm confused as to how you transitioned from what you wrote immeadiately before that to what you write next. But I assume the what you list are the assumptions and contradictions of Christianity and I will treat them as such.


- A good God would use evil to for his own purpose.


God didn't put the evil there (unless you are talking about “natural evil” ie calamities, which are not instances of moral evil). God did not cause the evil, but if he can direct the path of that evil for good purposes, then I don't see the problem. An example is God's hardening pharoah's heart. He magnified the pride and evil so that it would lead to actions that could be dealt with. This was also important for the nation of Egypt which had a similar evil, and threw Pharoah's evil, the nation was punished for its evil.


- God has some sufficient reason why he waited thousands (if not millions) of years to defeat evil, despite being more than capable of doing so.

Me thinks your idea of “cosmic evil” is of some substance apart from what evil actually is, which is primarily about the relations between personal beings. And since it is about persons, God has been at work by repairing persons in personal/relational ways.


- God is free to use some other means to test us, but intentionally chose suffering.


God allowed suffering into the world because a world with suffering provided a context for redemption. It is a world where passions run deep and instances for compassion and dependence on other people is essential (remember, the dependence on others is an important part of the nature of our redemption).


Example Conhridictions?

- God creates supernatural beings that are perfect and have intimate knowledge of God's power, yet they decide to turn against him.


I don't see how this is a contradiction. It only highlights that God likes working threw persons and has given persons freedom (including angels and fallen angels).


- God does not have to appease himself before he can save us.

This presumes that penal substitution provides the full explanation of how the cross saves us. I do not believe that it is sufficient in and of itself. But I am also content to live with some mystery here.


- God is perfectly good but uses his omnipotent power to intentionally feed us false information.


I admit I don't fully understand this one. But I don't think that it is insignificant at all that if you are in that position, scripture has made it clear that it is your fault for hating the truth to begin with.

Of course, inas much as it goes with hardening by God (which is proceeded by rebellion) the purpose there is to bring the evil of the heart out into the open so that it may be dealt with in a real way. In a sense, hardening the heart doesn't remove free will so much as it may lead to a situation where the moment of free choice may be renewed.


- God is perfectly good but exhibits human emotions, such as jealousy or anger

Those are perfectly good emotions in the right context. The jealousy of God is born of God's love.


- A good God demands humans take part in, or assists with committing genocide.


A good God recognized that those cultures were deplorable and were an affront to his rescue operation through Israel and could've lead Israel towards the most evil practices (and did in fact do so since Israel didn't eliminate all of those peoples but took up their practices not just of Idolotry but even child sacrifice.


As an insider of Christianity, these seem reasonable to you. But as an outsider, they appear to be assumptions and contradictions.


So are you saying that the recognition of assumptions and contradictions is subjective?